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Introduction 
I am currently being trolled by Russian rap fans in droves posting 
straight up Nazi propaganda. The Russian hip hop scene is extremely 
racist. It’s being led by racists like @sdthaking and i1official (@Talib 
Kweli 2020)1
The above tweet was posted at the end of February 2020 in the middle 
of a heated Twitter controversy between famous us  rapper Talib Kweli 
and the Russian hip-hop community, in which he described the en-
tire Russian rap scene as racist, Nazi and state sponsored.2 Thе scandal 
quickly spread to other social media platforms and got extensive cover-
age online and even on the official Russian t v  channels. But what exactly 
1 In the wake of a harassment-related scandal Talib Kweli was permanently banned 
from Twitter on 4 July 2020. It is for this reason that none of his original Tweets are 
available anymore. The retypes of tweets are based on screenshots circulated in sec-
ondary sources or collected by me during the initial stage of research for this chapter 
(the same applies to Twitter screenshots used here but not available in the original to 
reference).
2 Talib Kweli is a rapper known for his outspoken activist stance against police bru-
tality and racial oppression in the usa . His early recognition is linked to the criti-
cally acclaimed band Black Star, which he formed together with Mos Def in 1997 in 
Brooklyn, New York. This style of hip-hop, known as conscious hip-hop, is usually 
juxtaposed with gangsta rap.
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pushed Talib Kweli to draw these conclusions and what could explain the 
extraordinary response this conflict received in the Russian media? 
My analysis of this conflict is divided into five sections. I provide 
more details and investigate how it was reframed in geopolitical terms 
by Russian media. I show how Russian media transformed the conflict 
from a subcultural hip-hop conversation about race and privilege into 
an attack on Russians as a nation, animating Cold War discourses and 
anti-American sentiments and bringing the ethnically diverse Russian 
hip-hop community under the banner of patriotic (ethnic) Russianness. 
Secondly, I explore the geopolitical inflections of Talib Kweli’s accusa-
tions of trolling and racism, as he mobilized the discourses of Russian in-
tervention in the us  elections and of Russian trolls to delegitimize his op-
ponents. Thirdly, building upon a subset of trolling literature, which ar-
gues for the need to distinguish between different types of trolling, over-
come moral evaluations of trolling and recognize potentially subversive 
aspects of trolling, I examine the trolling flash mob launched by Dvach 
(2ch.hk) imageboard users who aimed to provoke both sides. Finally, I 
focus on how the scandal was taken up by the Russian rap community 
with an emphasis on the travel of us  racial politics to Russia through 
the medium of hip-hop. While being overdetermined by geopolitics and 
mistranslation, the conflict nevertheless allows insight into the Russian 
hip-hop scene as an arena of intense negotiation of discourses about race 
and racism. This Twitter controversy presents a unique case for examin-
ing what the accusations of trolling and racism do to the dynamics of a 
conflict, how both the accusations and reactions to them are embedded 
in larger geopolitical tensions, and how they bounce back against local-
ized Internet ecologies and subcultures such as hip-hop. 
More about the conflict
On 24 February 2020 avid Twitter user Talib Kweli tweeted: “Only a rac-
ist white person would deny that they have white privileges” (@TalibKweli 
2020) in response to another Twitter post. One of his followers, a rapper 
from Russia, I1, replied to Talib Kweli’s tweet with: “For a person from 
Russia where most ppl are white & slavery existed until 1861 and police 
terrorizes the poor & dissidents it’s so hard to always read only about 
white privilege. While financial, talent & personal qualities privileges are 
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often way more powerful.”3 This comment was dismissed as an example 
of white privilege by Talib Kweli. Subsequent heated discussion involved 
Talib Kweli’s fans and Russian rap artists, who joined the Twitter thread 
(namely PLC, Dime, SD, Maestro A-Sid and Roma Jigan) and tried to 
explain the Russian cultural context. Unconvinced, Talib Kweli accused 
the interlocutors of racism and doubted their ability to grasp black mar-
ginalization. Gradually the conversation shifted into a barrage of mu-
tual insults. Anonymous users from the Russian-language imageboard 
Dvach (Двач), known for its antagonistic, disruptive, and politically 
incorrect communication style, flooded Twitter to fight a memetic war 
against both sides. 
Images and their circulation in social media played a striking role in the 
conflict. It was photography’s presumed indexical relations to “truth” 
that were used to shore up the claims made. The same indexical rela-
tions were contested through the memetic flash mob. Thus, an old photo-
collage (photozhaba in Russian Internet slang), featuring Russian rapper 
Oxxxymiron, Mikhail Boiarskii and rapper SD doing a Nazi salute, was 
dug up and pitched to Talib Kweli as “proof” of his suspicions about the 
racism of the Russian rap scene.4 It is important to contextualize that 
3 twitter.com/I1Official/status/1231923350504603649.
4 Photozhaba translates literally as “phototoad.” It appropriates the word Photoshop, 
where original photomontages were created. Photozhaba is an iconic, humorous, 
memetic genre for early Russian Internet culture. Mikhail Boiarskii was photo-
81#RUS SI A N R A PI SR AC I S T VS #RUS SI A N NA Z I PU RG E PA RT Y
ethnically Jewish Viktor SD from the Antihype hip-hop association ap-
proaches this symbolism in a profoundly ironic way. SD has been on the 
hip-hop scene from 2002 as a battle rapper and founder of multiple la-
bels. Known as an enfant terrible of underground Russian rap, he es-
pouses anti-establishment values, trolls commercial hip-hop artists, and 
makes ironic use of politically incorrect slurs and profanities to refer to 
himself, his colleagues from Antihype, and the world around him (Nilov 
2017). Taking this photo as proof that SD is a convinced Nazi, Talib Kweli 
launched a twitter hashtag #russianrapisracist to expose the Russian rap 
scene. In turn, motivated by the desire to troll both sides, Dvach users 
launched a hashtag #RussianNaziPurgeParty, outing “famous Russian 
Nazi rappers” through photo memes. 
The conflict took another turn when Talib Kweli learned that Russian 
rapper Timati’s first album and his musical label are called Black Star, 
just like his own band with Mos Def (talibkweli Instagram 2020). Timati 
was accused of stealing and cultural appropriation. Talib Kweli posted 
several pictures of Timati, including a screenshot from the 2008 Russian 
shopped to the picture later, while the original picture features Oxxxymiron, SD and 
his brother. I found that both the original and the photozhaba had already been pub-
lished in 2013 on the hip-hop.ru forum (hip-hop.ru 2013). This is confirmed by SD’s 
now deleted Tweet: “I am jewish, not a nazi, this salute is sarcasm, the man in the 
middle is photoshop, u moron, fact.”
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comedy Hitler Kaput! where Timati’s character (DJ 50 Bundes Schilling 
aka Super-agent Timati) is seen sitting under a Nazi flag. This picture 
served as proof of Timati’s alleged Nazi leanings. Another picture posted 
showed Timati and Vladimir Putin shaking hands.5 Talib Kweli took the 
Timati-Putin handshake, a collection of photozhabas and deliberately 
provocative tweets as convincing evidence that the entire Russian rap 
scene is racist, Nazi and sponsored by the state. He started presenting his 
opponents as Russian trolls, paid by Trump to target Talib Kweli for his 
activist beliefs. In a short interview he interpreted this trolling flash mob 
as a broader case of global far-right mobilization and said that fighting 
racists empowers him.6
Russian media framing of the conflict
This Twitter controversy received extraordinary attention in the Russian 
media, spanning from state-sponsored outlets to specialized media about 
rap. Thus, conservative t v  channel Tsargrad, which defines itself as “the 
voice of the Russian Orthodox majority,” posted the news about the con-
flict under the headline: Тимати ультраправый, Егор Крид — лютый 
неонаци: Американского рэпера, оскорбившего русских, наказали 
(Tsargrad 25.02.2020).7 This antagonistic framing emphasizes the idea 
that Talib Kweli’s statements should be regarded as an insult not only to 
the Russian rap community, but the entire nation. The usage of slightly 
informal vocabulary with elements of slang reinforces the message that 
“punishment” is justified. Gazeta.ru newspaper covered the conflict with 
the headline Спорить мы не бросим: легенда рэпа из США против 
русских and the subheading Американский рэпер Талиб Квели на-
звал Тимати «нацистом» (Gazeta.ru 25.02.2020).8 The click-bait style 
of the heading gets more nuanced in the body of the article where russkie 
are replaced with rossiiskie khip-khop ispolniteli (hip-hop artists from 
5 instagram.com/p/B8_q0m1g9XO/. Timati indeed supports the Russian government 
and does not shy away from pro-government videos.
6 tmz.com/2020/03/08/talib-kweli-fighting-nazis-racists-russian-trolls-online-em-
powering.
7 “Timati is far-right, Egor Kreed — a hardcore neo-Nazi: American rapper who insult-
ed [ethnic] Russians has been punished.” Tsargrad is a young conservative channel 
founded in 2015, supporting Orthodox Christianity, ‘traditional values’ and ethnic 
Russian nationalism. (All translations are my own, unless otherwise stated.)
8 “We will not stop arguing: rap legend from the usa  against (ethnic) Russians. Ameri-
can rapper Talib Kweli called Timati ‘Nazi’.”
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Russia) and ethnonationalist framing is muted (Gazeta.ru 25.02.2020). 
In both sources the confrontation is presented as a quasi-civilizational 
conflict targeting the country as a whole.9 The Tsargrad and Gazeta.ru 
headlines achieve this effect through strategically replacing “Russian 
rappers” with “Russians.” This omission precludes the reading of the con-
troversy as a subcultural conversation about rap and presents ethnically 
diverse rappers performing in Russian as ethnically Russian. 
The examples above show that Russian media consistently conflated 
rossiiskii and russkii when translating the conflict back from English to 
Russian for Russian-speaking audiences. The first term denotes citizen-
ship of the Russian Federation, while the second could be translated 
into English as ethnically Russian or referring to Russian language. The 
slippage from rossiiskii to russkii can therefore have exclusionary un-
dertones, marginalizing minorities and Russia’s status as a multi-ethnic 
federation. The slippage also ignores distinctions between language, 
ethnicity and citizenship, which do not map neatly on each other in the 
post-Soviet space. Musicians performing in Russian might not necessar-
ily be ethnically Russian or Russian citizens themselves. The case of the 
rapper Scriptonite, who is incredibly popular in Russia, is useful here. A 
Kazakhstan citizen and ethnic Kazakh, Scriptonite raps in Russian, but 
explicitly objects when the term russkii rap is applied to him (colta.ru 
2016). The slippages in translation between russkii and rossiiskii were in-
strumental in the geopolitical framing of the conflict in the Russian me-
dia, which presented it as a quasi-war between Russians and Americans. 
Relying on the imaginaries of Cold War confrontation, a homogenous 
image of Russia as a community of ethnic Russians was reinforced. 
Strategic translation choices might have also helped to present Russian 
rap as a patriotic music genre in the Russian authorities’ ongoing efforts 
to harness the power of rap to influence youth.
The conflict was also covered by the pro-government channel 
Россия 24 (Russia 24) which put up a video: Рэперов Тимати и Крида 
Обвинили в Расизме (Rossiya 24 26.02.2020).10 After covering the ba-
sics, the presenter introduced short clips of rapper Roma Jigan, who ac-
cused Talib Kweli of “black racism,” and marketer Nataliia Bek, who said 
9 Similar rhetoric was used by other Russian media, but I focus here on select repre-
sentative examples.
10 “Rappers Timati and Kreed are accused of racism.”
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that Russian Internet users have a good sense of humor, which is often 
not understood by us  users. The presenter then tried to explain the inten-
sity of the conflict to the audience: 
Впрочем, может быть действительно сложно распознать иро-
нию, либо надо очень сильно верить в расистскую повестку, ко-
торую у нас вряд ли можно назвать акутальной, по сравнению со 
Штатами, где все нередко скатывается в истерию.11 
Another participant in the conflict, rapper Obe1Kenobe, explained in a 
clip that Talib Kweli как больной человек ругается с детьми.12 He add-
ed that this conflict had come as a shock to Russian rappers because of 
Talib Kweli’s iconic status: Лично я его считал очень интеллигентным 
человеком.13 The presenter concluded: 
Вот и получается — одни откровенно шутят, и это порой правда 
смешно, когда другой в грудь себя бьет и заявляет о пресловутом 
белом доминировании и угнетении по расовому признаку. Black 
Star, судя по логике, даже в названии ущемляет тех, кто black.14
The video dismisses accusations of racism as far-fetched. Racial conflict 
is discursively displaced as an issue completely irrelevant to Russia, and 
problems of racism are exterritorialized to the usa . As anthropologist 
Alaina Lemon argues, race “became a key term in Cold War ideological 
struggles” between the usa  and ussr  where both states “competed to de-
pict racial equality at home and to ascribe racism to the enemy” (Lemon 
2019, 60). Elements of this discourse framed the coverage of the Twitter 
conflict as well. By contrasting Russia with the usa , an image of peace-
ful multicultural coexistence within Russia is reproduced, where people 
11 “Maybe it is indeed difficult to discern irony or maybe one has to firmly believe in the 
racist agenda, which can hardly be called relevant to us in comparison to the usa , 
where things often lead to hysteria.”
12 “Like a sick man he is fighting with kids.”
13 “I personally thought of him as a highly cultured man.”
14 “So this is how it goes: some are openly joking and to be honest this is funny some-
times, and the other thumps his chest and claims so-called white domination and 
oppression based on race. Black Star, according to this logic, already in its name op-
presses those who are black.”
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do not get offended by racist jokes. Talib Kweli’s accusations of racism 
are described as nonsensical and extravagant, and dismissed as “chest-
thumping” and the result of a lack of a sense of humor. Russia is thereby 
reclaimed as a place that managed to preserve healthy irony in opposi-
tion to the usa , which is presented as obsessed with political correctness. 
Thus, in this example, we can see how anti-Americanism espoused by the 
official media in Russia uses the usa’s racial tensions and culture of polit-
ical correctness to advance a portrait of Russia’s civilizational difference. 
It is worth noting that while this Twitter scandal received extraordinary 
attention in the Russian media, it was barely noticed in the us  media or 
specialized English-language sources on rap. The next section looks more 
closely at how the geopolitical imaginary was employed by Talib Kweli in 
his framing of the events.
Geopolitics of Russian trolling 
As well as accusing the Russian rap scene of being state-sponsored, racist 
and Nazi, Talib Kweli called his opponents “Russian trolls” and linked 
the conflict to global far-right mobilization, assuming connections be-
tween Trump and Putin: “These state sponsored racist Russian rappers 
are here trolling me on behalf of @realdonaldtrump pay attention people. 
This was never about rap. This is a targeted election interference from 
Russia” (@TalibKweli 27.02.2020). Talib Kweli’s reaction to the conflict 
hints at his reliance on the moral panic about Russia’s intervention in 
the us  elections. Using the frames available for the interpretation in the 
us  context, such as “Russian trolls paid by Putin” to characterize his op-
ponents, Talib Kweli aims to undermine their legitimacy and dismiss 
their arguments. In so doing he builds upon the “Russia scare” discours-
es that have dominated the us  mediascape over the last couple of years 
(Tsygankov 2019). 
I approach the “Russia scare” discourse as a moral panic associated 
with Russia’s digital warfare (Simons 2019). This moral panic is prolif-
erated through a set of Western intelligence and think-tank reports on 
“countering” Russia’s “propaganda machine.” Such reports and studies 
are usually dedicated to the analysis of the famous “troll factory” in St. 
Petersburg (Chen 2015), Russia-related fake accounts on Twitter, and 
Russia’s alleged meddling in us  affairs, such as the election of Donald 
86 DI NA R A YA NG E L DI NA
Trump (amongst other things).15 There is a number of problematic as-
sumptions associated with the discourse of election interference, such as 
the disavowal of agency of local voters and overemphasizing the effects 
even if the alleged intervention has taken place. But it is through these 
reports and accompanying journalistic pieces that the discourse of the 
“Russia scare” gets spread and acquires a life of its own, transforming into 
a number of ready-made clichés for interpreting reality. Such discourse 
frames Russia through a highly alarmist vocabulary, rendering it a “mega 
folk devil” (Simons 2019, 202). It is imagined as a threat to Western de-
mocracy and everything opposite to what “the West” is. Vitaly Kazakov 
and Stephen Hutchings frame this trend as the “information war para-
digm” (2019, 137), which has been the dominant interpretation lens for 
recent Russia-West relations. As Alexei Yurchak aptly puts it, such a lens 
reduces ‘Russia’ to a space that supposedly exists outside of the geopo-
litical context, a zone that is subjected exclusively to its own internal 
logic of authoritarianism and corruption and that is populated by an 
army of computer hackers, internet trolls and kgb/gru/fsb  agents. 
(Yurchak 2018, 95). 
Contemporary commentators argue that the Ukraine crisis facilitated 
the reappearance of mirror image discourse in relations between Russia 
and “the West” (Smith 2018). Urie Bronfenbrenner’s 1961 mirror image 
hypothesis dates back to Cold War times and was proposed to explain 
mutually distorted images in us–ussr  relations (Bronfenbrenner 1961). 
As Arutunyan suggests in a recent piece on the 2020 Black Lives Matter 
protests, both the us  and Russia mirror each other in making claims 
of foreign interference as an explanation of domestic unrest (2020). 
Through this conspiratorial logic, denying agency to local protesters and 
presenting them as “merely the puppets of powerful foreign forces” ab-
solves governments of responsibility and the need to tackle protesters’ 
demands, placing the responsibility instead on the figure of the foreign 
enemy that needs to be fought (Arutunyan 2020). This discourse forms 
another layer in the historical ways of framing Russia: from the orientali-
zation of Russia and Eastern Europe through Western travelogues (Wolff 
15 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to determine how finely the claims of these 
reports assess the impact of Russia’s “hybrid warfare” on Western societies.
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1994), through Cold War narratives of Sovietology and us  understand-
ings of the Soviet subject (Krylova 2000), to the contemporary situation 
heightened by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and alleged meddling in the 
us  elections (Tsygankov 2019). One of the paradoxical effects of “Russia 
scare” discourse is that the Russian government effectively deflects such 
narratives by mirroring them with the discourse of Russophobia, i.e. any 
Western criticisms of Russia are presented to citizens as manifestations 
of Russophobia.
When discourses of trolling converge with the “Russia scare” frame in 
the context of the “new Cold War” paradigm, the image of the “Russian 
troll” gets peculiar traction. This figure, which has acquired a life of its 
own, needs to be put in a wider context of research on trolling. Within 
Internet studies there is a rich literature that tries to understand the phe-
nomenon of Internet trolling. Trolling is often framed in highly loaded 
terms, associated with hate speech, bullying, misogyny, antisocial behav-
ior, deception, immaturity, damage, inauthenticity, pathology, sadism 
and threat (De Seta 2013; Bishop 2014; Sanfilippo, Fichman, and Yang 
2018). The tenacity of the “Russian troll” figure can be explained by the 
fact that it merges two highly negative signifiers. The “Russian troll” is 
imagined as non-human through association with the “troll factory.” If 
Internet trolls are constructed as simply malignant and hateful bullies, 
Russian trolls are particularly evil — they are fakes threatening democ-
racy, and instruments of propaganda undermining the very foundations 
of Western civilization. It is possible to see here a reconfiguration of Cold 
War “practices of competitive contrast” (Lemon 2019, 60) where another 
important axis apart from race was “freedom of speech and thought.” 
The panic around Russia’s “information warfare” resuscitates the Cold 
War tropes of information censorship threatening freedom of speech and 
democracy. Democracy in turn becomes positioned as uniquely Western 
and free from any contamination/influence.
It has been noted by scholars of trolling that calling one’s opponent a 
troll can be used as a strategy to delegitimize opponents and their opin-
ions (Knustad 2020). By evoking Russian trolls imagery, Talib Kweli ho-
mogenized the rather fractured community of Russian rappers and their 
fans, paradoxically contributing to its temporary cohesion. Moreover, the 
deployment of “Russian troll” imagery allowed him to disregard the cen-
tral reason for the conflict — cultural mistranslation in the discussion on 
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race and oppression across contexts. My attempt to understand trolling 
in the context of the Twitter controversy builds upon the growing current 
in trolling literature, which calls for distinctions between different types 
of trolling (Sanfilippo, Fichman & Yang 2018). This current analyzes 
more neglected dimensions of trolling and its carnivalesque side, such 
as “mockery, hilarity, deception and absurdity for confronting powerful 
ideologies” (Mylonas & Kompatsiaris 2019, 2), interprets some forms of 
online trolling as “creative insurgency” (Tovares 2019) and potentially 
transgressive cultural production for counter-hegemonic means, and ar-
gues for “localized understanding of Internet cultures” in non-Western 
contexts (De Seta 2013). However, I also agree with Kerr and Lee who “ar-
gue against categorizing trolls by their assumed intentions” (2019) as an 
important caveat against projecting our moral assumptions on the analy-
sis of trolling. De Seta’s genealogical approach (2017) to trolling litera-
ture is useful in that it maps an “endorsement-critique” axis as one of the 
guiding controversies in the academic approaches to trolling. Depending 
on the ethical orientation of the researcher, trolling can be celebrated as a 
disruptive and subversive practice promoting democratic deliberation, or 
conversely as anti-social and malicious activity (De Seta 2017, 399–400). 
It seems to me that there is an implicit danger in some academic works 
examining trolling in authoritarian contexts and focusing on anti-gov-
ernment memes and protest humor. They can sometimes result in what 
de Seta calls “exaltation of disruptive figures” (De Seta 2017, 400) which 
also connects to how contemporary Russian culture is often interpreted 
through either a totalizing oppression or disruptive resistance lens. But 
how can we deal, for example, with anti-government memes using de-
humanizing vocabulary against opponents? Or with Putin-as-gay-clown 
memes designed to counter the homophobia of the Russian state but im-
plicitly building on transphobic rhetoric (Wiedlack 2020)? Or, in terms 
of the Twitter controversy, what to make of trolling both used as a geopo-
litically inflected accusation and as actual practices embedded in local-
ized Internet subcultures based on memetic humor such as Dvach?
Trolling for lulz and elusive politics of truth in photographic memes 
The trolling flash mob launched against Talib Kweli should be placed 
within the tradition of Russian Internet humor. This tradition is rooted 
in satirical memes and parodic websites such as Lurkmore.ru where eve-
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ryone is mocked, including those in power, by using explicitly offensive, 
provocative and politically incorrect language. Dvach is an anonymous 
Russian-language imageboard, popular among young people, known for 
antagonistic, ironic, anti-establishment and politically incorrect material 
and deliberate defiance of social norms. “The logic of lulz” favoring “dis-
tanced irony and critique” informs cultures of anonymous imageboards 
such as 4chan (Milner 2013). As Milner contends, Internet memes serve 
as an aesthetic manifestation of the logic of lulz (Milner 2013). This logic 
and other “irony laden communicative practices” ultimately have the po-
tential both to “reinforce essentialisms and disrupt them” (Milner 2013). 
Having been banned multiple times by Roskomnadzor, the Dvach im-
ageboard gained its iconic notoriety through “online raids” of its users, 
defending multiple causes: from de-anonymizing people who torture an-
imals, faking the death of its owner Nariman Namazov in Kemerovo fires 
to the witch-hunt style exposure of women who starred in a pornograph-
ic video with Rammstein front man Till Lindemann. It was “the logic of 
lulz” that was explicitly motivating Dvach users on /b/ board16 to launch a 
memetic campaign on Twitter. But importantly while the first goal was to 
troll Talib Kweli and other “social justice warriors” for lulz’s sake, the sec-
ond was to: Выставить русский рэп в глазах иностранной обществен-
ности как расистскую музыку для нациков (2ch.hk/b/ 26.02.2020).17 
To achieve these goals, Dvach users employed a strategy of hyperbolic 
over-identification with Talib Kweli’s claim that Russian rap is racist 
and Nazi. Thus, in response to Talib Kweli’s hashtag #Russianrapisracist, 
Dvach users launched the hashtag #RussianNaziPurgeParty. The photos, 
some of which were deliberately taken out of context and others pho-
toshopped, were accompanied by tweets outing “Nazi Russian rappers.” 
The ironic effect of this memetic bacchanalia, designed to both compro-
mise Russian rap and troll Talib Kweli and his followers, was achieved 
through the incongruity between the tweet and the photo, requiring cul-
tural knowledge of the Russian context to be detected. Competing in pro-
ducing alleged exposures of the “racism of the Russian rap scene,” some 
of the memes relied on the use of profanities and racist tropes.18 
16 A “random” or “bullshit” section on imageboards where anything, however shock-
ing, can be posted.
17 “Present Russian rap in the eyes of the Western public as racist music for Nazis.”
18 They were later scorned by a significant number of Russian rap fans.
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However, others, while being deliberately incongruous, provoca-
tive and deceptive, managed to make a socio-political commentary on 
Russian society. As Shifman argues, photography-based memes and the 
spread of the digital capability to manipulate the images have questioned 
“photography’s assumed indexical relation to the world” and photogra-
phy’s “rhetoric of truthfulness” (Shifman 2014). The deliberate incongru-
ity between the text and the photo performs a double role of both con-
testing the indexical relations of images to the world and making politi-
cal comments on pertinent social issues (Shifman 2014). To explore this 
further, I focus on several memetic photos from the Twitter controversy. 
One image where such relations are contested is a non-manipulated pho-
to posted by Twitter user @RapNazi. The photo is taken from the same 
parodic comedy Hitler Kaput! where young Timati plays the role of a DJ. 
Screaming, he tries to escape from a gang of skinheads following him 
through the park. The tweet addressed to Talib Kweli says: “Nazi rap-
per Timati who steal Black Star name, leads Russian Skinheads attacking 
black people in Moscow. From Russian movie ‘Heat’ (2006).”19 The text 
here reverses the meaning of the image, where being chased is deliber-
19 twitter.com/RapNazi/status/1232408151451938818
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ately replaced by leading, which achieves an ironic effect, transforming 
the potential target of the skinheads into their leader. Although the im-
age comes from a movie and is, therefore, by definition staged, it contains 
a reference to the late 90s in Russia when hip-hop fans were persecuted 
by skinheads.20 
The next manipulated photo from the same user, @RapNazi, depicts a 
military parade on Red Square in Moscow with Timati’s smiling face su-
perimposed. It is accompanied by the tweet: “God bless you, Talib, finally 
someone is telling the truth about Timati. We are tired of living in fear. 
You are a real warrior of light! He should not come to power and built the 
Fourth Reich in Russia.”21 This memetic photo works on several levels. Its 
sarcasm is expressed by the emphatic usage of “truth” and “warrior of 
light” to refer to Talib Kweli. Meta-level references here hint at Timati’s 
recent fashion collaboration with the Russian Army and thus problema-
20 Statistics collected by the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, sova-center.ru.
21 twitter.com/RapNazi/status/1232411022251765760
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tize his support for the government and Russian authorities’ attempts to 
harness youth approval through popular culture. 
Another photozhaba designed in menacing dark red tones, posted by 
@DanilaSokolovsk, portrays the biggest opposition political figure in 
Russia, Aleksei Navalnyi, against a backdrop of what looks like a Nazi 
march. Navalnyi is wearing a swastika armband on his shirt, while the 
accompanying tweet describes him as a “famous Russian Nazi,” “leader 
of the far-right organization Navalnyi team” and YouTube blogger and 
rapper.”22 The memetic politics of “truth telling” here hints at Navalnyi’s 
early career participation in Russian nationalist marches and his suc-
cess on YouTube, but at the same time lures the reader into seeing him 
as a rapper, his current political orientation as “far-right” and the 2019 
protests against fraud in the Moscow municipal elections as “far-right 
demonstrations.”
22 twitter.com/DanilaSokolovsk
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The memetic flash mob presented multiple figures as “Russian Nazi 
rappers,” starting from Ramzan Kadyrov to Dvach owner Nariman 
Namazov, including a tweet “on behalf” of the president of Russia who 
is delivering an address to the Federal Assembly stating: “Russia de-
clares war on the prominent leader of American Nation Talib Kweli, 
because we must secure the existence of Russian hip-hop and future of 
our rappers!”23 This ironic tweet in response to Talib Kweli’s accusations 
that the Russian rap scene is pro-Putin frames the conflict in geopolitical 
terms as a grotesque war between the usa  and Russia. The second part of 
the sentence parodies the notorious far-right slogan “We must secure the 
existence of our people and a future for white children,” but “our people” 
is replaced with “Russian hip-hop” and the children’s future becomes the 
rappers’ future. In the context of the Russian state’s investment in w w ii 
commemorations of the victory over fascism, the tweet’s use of mockery 
and absurdity confronts the “new Cold War narrative,” the anti-Ameri-
can sentiments of the Russian government as well as the “Russia scare” 
discourse of Talib Kweli. 
To understand the effect on the Russian hip-hop community, it might 
be useful to apply the dynamic groupness concept, where groupness 
is understood as an event (Kazakov & Hutchings 2019). Through the 
confrontation with Talib Kweli and geopolitical framing of the conflict 
employed by both sides dynamic groupness was temporarily achieved, 
uniting Russian rappers and their fans who were otherwise heterogene-
23 twitter.com/laikastronaut/status/1232632074995224582
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ous both stylistically and politically. The Russian rap scene is fractured 
along different lines, not only in terms of an opposition or pro-govern-
ment stance, a pairing through which Russian rap is often understood 
(Ewell 2017; Liebig 2020). For example, some artists are considered more 
pop, copycats and sell-outs (such as Timati), some more indie and “true” 
(Oxxymiron), some anti-establishment outsiders (such as SD) etc. There 
are splits between generations, perceived stylistic mastery in music and 
lyrics, subgenres of rap etc. This heterogeneity was also reflected in how 
the conflict was taken up within the Russian hip-hop community. 
On double mistranslation of race: “we are not white, we are Russian”
One of the implicit questions that animated the Twitter conflict was the 
meaning of race across contexts. What happens when the activist politics 
informing Talib Kweli’s hip-hop travels from one place to another? Can 
racial ontologies travel through hip-hop? What does it do for the discus-
sion of racial politics in Russian hip-hop? Are white people guests in hip-
hop, as famous rapper Eminem recently acknowledged?24 Are Russians 
white, as one of the participants in the conflict, Maestro A-Sid, doubted 
(@TalibKweli 2020)? What does whiteness mean in Russia? Who can be 
considered “black” in Russia? Does race matter for Russia, as Lemon puts 
it? (2019) And how is all this negotiated in a genre heavily influenced by 
us  black politics in the context of increased geopolitical confrontations 
between Russia and the usa? Variations of these questions engaged the 
Russian hip-hop community in the wake of the controversy, which was 
taken very seriously. A specialized Russian-language website dedicated 
to hip-hop culture, the-flow.ru, published three opinion pieces on the is-
sue in February–March 2020 with over 1,000 user comments in total. 
Numerous videos explaining the conflict appeared on Russian YouTube 
24 youtube.com/watch?v=3PUYyD-W6sg
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hip-hop channels. It should be noted that most Russian rappers who took 
part in the Twitter conflict are skilled translocal interpreters of both con-
texts, having lived in the us  or Europe; they speak fluent English and 
are able to debate the tensions fragmenting the English-language hip-hop 
scene, including the place of race in it. One reason why the controversy 
had such a resonance was the iconic status of Talib Kweli’s rap for many 
Russian rappers. His conscious hip-hop with explicit anti-oppression 
and social justice-oriented texts was an important source of inspiration. 
Thus, the rapper PLC expressed his bitter disappointment in Talib Kweli, 
saying that he had grown up on his music and was shocked by his un-
willingness to “listen.” One of the recurrent themes in comment threads 
was a sense of sadness at the cultural mistranslation which sparked the 
trolling flash mob. Thus, one user bitterly remarked (the-flow.ru2020):25
 
@moscowidov lamented: “Everyone will laugh and it will be over but 
‘Russian rap is racist’ will stick around (not to say that there isn’t a prob-
lem, just not in the form it was imagined by the old man).”26 There is 
25 “This is a big problem for all who took part in this hype, they don’t think that for Talib 
and the us  scene this is not a discussion where smart Russians (russkie) explain the 
multiplicity of racism, but instead massive racist trolling. Now to Talib and his fans 
Russia is a racist enclave.”
26 twitter.com/moscowidov
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a shared fear among users that the conflict will have a profound effect 
on the Russian rap scene, permanently branding Russia as racist and 
preventing us  hip-hop artists from touring in Russia. The trouble with 
translating Russia back and the failure to translate it properly become 
particularly pertinent in a context informed by global hip-hop’s inspira-
tion by us  hip-hop, us  world hegemony in the production of popular 
culture, and the heightened geopolitical tensions between Russia and the 
“West,” which influence the stories about Russia that “stick” and those 
that don’t. 
Related questions animated a round table Real Talk #1  hosted by I1 on 
his YouTube channel in the wake of the conflict.27 This round table dem-
onstrated that first tier participants in the conflict are well versed in the 
context of us  hip-hop debates and wider us  politics. Among the questions 
discussed were discourses emanating from us  hip-hop stars, positioning 
hip-hop as an African American cultural form appropriated by white 
artists, and the implications such discussions might have for hip-hop 
scenes in Japan, South Korea and Russia. As Pennycook argues, the ten-
sion between authenticity in hip-hop (hip-hop as an African American 
cultural form coming from the experience of black marginalization) 
and the global spread of hip-hop premised on hip-hop localization is a 
structuring one for the genre (Pennycook 2007). Authenticity thus be-
comes a barrier to the global spread of hip-hop. Helbig and Miszczynski 
(2017, 1) highlight how Eastern European hip-hop has been stigmatized 
as inauthentic for the “lack of historical connections to black identity.” 
Rooting hip-hop authenticity in engagement with the local community 
and providing “local definitions of what matters” and “local horizons 
of significance” become a strategy of hip-hop’s localization (Pennycook 
2007, 102–106). Various local experiences of marginalization (including 
racialization) can be used as localized discourses of authenticity. What 
localized discourses of authenticity does Russian hip-hop build upon and 
what place do ethnic and racial difference play within it?
The conservative writer Zakhar Prilepin who made multiple com-
mentaries on Russian rap once observed on his LiveJournal page: Russian 
rap artists upon closer examination are extremely ethnically diverse.28 
Making a connection between us  black culture and post-Soviet hip-hop 
27 youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=Or199ZW7E6I
28 prilepin.livejournal.com/861464.html
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“International” through the discourse of “hot blood,” he lists the nation-
alities (ethnicities) of well-known Russian rappers. He concludes that 
Russian rap of the 2010s is in fact a product of Armenians, Azerbaijanis, 
Kazakhs, Ossetians, Jews and Russians from the southern borderlands 
of Russia. 
This remark points to the accepted thesis in hip-hop scholarship that this 
genre finds global resonance with minority groups and can serve as a 
platform for expressing grievances and experiences of marginalization. 
As Helbig and Miszczynski (2017, 2) argue, hip-hop reverberated so well 
in post-socialist spaces because its arrival coincided with the capitalist 
transition which was marred by extreme impoverishment, violence, cor-
ruption, and instability. However, the issue of ethnic difference on the 
Russian hip-hop scene has received almost no attention so far in the aca-
demic literature.29 
29 For exceptions see, for example, Mills 2018, Denisova & Herasimenka 2019. 
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While some hip-hop artists in Russia do not emphasize their eth-
nic origin, others actively embed it in their art. Jewish Oxxxymiron for 
example called one of his albums “The Eternal Jew,” while Tatar-Jewish 
Timati actively plays with his non-Russianness and ethno-racial ambigu-
ity both in his music and the productions of the Black Star label.
For example, he deliberately selects distinctly non-Slavic artists for his 
label, such as Georgian-Russian Levan Goroziya, Armenian Christina C, 
Kazakh Nazima, and Uzbek Mc Doni, or invents the fictional persona 
Teimuraz, a racialized migrant from Central Asia and the Caucasus, and 
uses him in his videos from 2014 to 2016. By appropriating the blackness 
of us  hip-hop aesthetics Timati infuses it with the meanings blackness 
acquires in the post-Soviet space, which in this respect makes him one 
of the most intriguing rap artists in Russia. “Blackness” in Russia is a 
slippery category, as Lemon (1995, 37) argues, being attached to bodies 
and thus immutable but at the same time highly malleable, pointing to-
wards different ethnic groups and conflating “moral, market and nation-
al identities” (1995, 37). Who can be racialized as “black” in Russia thus 
considerably differs from us  ontologies of race and us  understandings 
of blackness. I argue however, that this difference in meanings remains 
unreadable for Talib Kweli who associates race and processes of raciali-
zation writ large through anti-black racism in the us  and thus implicitly 
reproduces us-centric optics in interpreting “race” in other locales. His 
opponents pointing to the alternative histories of racialization are too 
quickly read as racism deniers and dismissed as Nazi “white boys,” while 
he constructs Russia as a “white country.” However, such framing disa-
vows the diversity within Russia and paradoxically coincides with the 
discourse of ethnic Russian nationalists promoting slogans like “Russia 
for ethnic Russians.”
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This paradox of not seeing difference where it exists was emphasized by 
some commentators versed in the understandings of both contexts, who 
tried to conduct a cultural translation of both “race” and Russian Internet 
humor and trolling to the us  audience. Thus, defending the Russian rap 
scene from accusations of being Nazi, some, such as user @holaasap 
(Talibkweli Instagram 2020), pointed out that both Oxxxymiron and 
SD portrayed on the photozhaba with Mikhail Boiarskii are Jewish and 
hence cannot be accused of Nazism and are allowed to employ the Nazi 
salute however they want, including as parody. Others stressed that 
Timati is half-Jew, half-Tatar and therefore cannot be considered fully 
“white” in contemporary Russia, hence Talib Kweli’s accusations of rac-
ism do not hold. 
The initial comment of I1 about the 1861 abolition of serfdom in the 
Russian Empire “where most people are white” was an attempt to draw 
similarities and differences between the two countries and respective leg-
acies of American chattel slavery and Russian peasant serfdom. Rather 
unfortunately, through such framing I1 has implicitly left out the un-
derstanding of Russia as a colonial empire and the importance of race in 
the Russian and Soviet context. The fact that both in the Russian Empire 
and the Soviet Union race was never a legal category and hence no legally 
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enforced racial regime was in place (Rainbow 2019, 4) should not lead us 
to the conclusion that “race did not matter” (Lemon 2019). Far from be-
ing an outlier, Vera Tolz argues, the Russian Empire picked up discourses 
on race circulating in nineteenth-century Europe, where “race, ethnic-
ity and nationhood were constructed as a single, integrated conceptual 
domain” (Tolz 2020, 49). This contradictory legacy of conceptual confu-
sion and terminological disarray was inherited by the Soviet state (Tolz 
2020, 49). The ussr  used categories of nationality and ethnicity instead 
of race and its anti-racist politics was important for the Cold War rivalry, 
constructing “communism’s superiority over its race-obsessed rivals in 
the fascist and capitalist West” (Rainbow 2019, 3). All these things make 
it difficult both for scholars of Russia and the ordinary population alike 
to “see race” and can partly account for the disavowal of racism, espe-
cially when looking for it in the past. Additionally, the accusations of 
racism in a genre so obviously indebted to and affectionately attached to 
the us  hip-hop scene hit particularly hard. The trouble of “seeing race” 
in Russia produced paradoxes in the Twitter conflict, when the problem 
of xenophobia as discrimination on the basis of nationality/ethnicity was 
acknowledged by the same rappers who denied the relevance of racism in 
the Russian context. Here too racism was perceived exclusively through 
the us  white-black dichotomy.
Accusations of the alleged Nazism of the Russian rap scene provoked 
vivid reactions among the Russian hip-hop community. However, they 
should not be linked only to Russia’s role in w w ii, but also to the lived 
memories of being attacked by neo-Nazi skinheads in the 1990s and ear-
ly 2000s for publicly wearing hip-hop style clothing. 
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It is these events that were brought up by the older generation of Russian 
rappers such as @maestroasid who mentioned in a tweet: “[…] We 
(Russian rappers) idolized and praise your music and the music of other 
rappers, we were beaten and maimed for listening rap, but we defended 
our right to listen what we like and you call us racists? You’re nonsense, 
mister”30 or @PustomRuka: “[…] Real nazis been jumping on me for 
wearing baggy pants in 2000s here.”31 It should be noted that there is 
already a generation of Russian rappers who stood at hip-hop’s early be-
ginnings in the 90s and a generation of people who grew up listening 
to hip-hop in Russian. That makes Russian hip-hop a highly localized 
genre. While hip-hop in post-socialist spaces in its beginnings was highly 
imitative of us  hip-hop aesthetics, later it developed its own trajectories 
(Miszczynski & Helbig 2017). Having this in mind, the Twitter conflict 
can also be seen through the lens of the struggle for Russian hip-hop’s 
autonomy from the perceived hegemony of us  hip-hop. 
I would like to pause on two more quotes from the-flow.ru, which epito-
mize the array of positions on the conflict. In this quote one user com-
ments: “It is funny to hear the reproaches of the black American that 
(ethnic) Russians are Nazi, while 1/3 of our state holidays and topics on 
state t v  channels concern the victory over the fascist occupiers” (the-
flow.ru 2020). In a reply to that comment, another user says: “And we 
rent out flats only to Slavs!” If the first comment aims to challenge the 
accusation of Nazism through bringing up memories of w w ii  and its 
centrality in state politics, the reply trolls this position through mention-
ing a distinctly post-Soviet example of xenophobia in the rental market, 
thereby juxtaposing official narratives of victory over fascism (hence the 
presumed absence of racism) and the experiences of everyday discrimi-
nation in big cities. 
30 twitter.com/maestroasid
31 twitter.com/PustomRuka
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I really hope that this is just another sarcasm competition, where 
both sides exhibit wonders of post-irony. On one side ‘our grandfa-
thers fought’ and ‘Russians were treated as negroes until 1861’. On the 
other — ‘all whites are racists by default’ and Timati’s photo as proof. 
Who would not resist trolling such bullshit? […] (the-flow.ru).32
The last comment articulates the double mistranslation of race happen-
ing in the conflict. Here both Russian and us  exceptionalisms are ques-
tioned. It mocks the tropes and memes used to disavow racism from the 
Russian side such as w w ii  and comparisons between serfdom and slav-
ery. It also criticizes the position of Talib Kweli for ignoring the trans-
national mutability of race. The trolling flash mob, which was initially 
launched to compromise both the Russian rap scene and Talib Kweli, is 
paradoxically framed as the only possible and legitimate response to the 
conflict where both sides occupy indefensible positions. 
As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the Russian rap scene is ani-
mated by intense negotiations of discourses coming from the us  through 
the vehicle of hip-hop, including us  racial politics and activism. Race, ra-
cialization, and its meanings mediated through hip-hop surfaced as cru-
cial in the understanding of the controversy. They have gone through the 
process of double mistranslation. Legacies of Cold War confrontation and 
contemporary tensions between Russia and the us  affected the framing 
of the conflict by both sides. In the Twitter conflict accusations of trolling 
to delegitimize the opponents were inflected through Talib Kweli’s panic 
at Russian information warfare. He tied the figure of the “Russian troll,” 
indexing fake, unfree, politically influenced speech, to Russian hip-hop. 
The latter got reframed as inauthentic, decoupled from “true” politics 
32 This is a well-known meme mocking the attitude when problems of the present 
(i.e. racism) are solved by referencing victory over fascism in the past (Great Patriotic 
War).
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(state-sponsored), and white racist appropriation of a black cultural form. 
Geopolitically inflected accusations of trolling obscured the role of the 
disruptive “trolling for lulz” flash mob conducted by anonymous users 
from the Dvach imageboard to compromise both sides. Bouncing back 
through cycles of interpretation across platforms, languages, contexts 
and subcultures, race and trolling got lost in translation. 
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